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STATISTICS IN THE LAW: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
IN THE PRESENTATION OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Although mathematical data bolstered American legal argument
beginning in the early twentieth century,' Oliver Wendell Holmes an-
ticipated the employment of statistics.' Holmes advocated the exercise
and continued refinement of methods using empirical data to reduce
evidentiary confusion and aid in the application of concise law Sup-
porters of the use of statistical data in the courtroom praise the facility
with which statistics clearly present a large accumulation of facts4 and
encourage consistency in a fact finder's analysis. 5 Opponents of the legal
use of mathematical data object to a potential bias that may not be
discoverable upon cross examination,6 a feared over-emphasis of the
' See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 412 (1908) (incorporation of sociological and
economic data into brief). Muller was the first in what became a series of "Brandeis briefs"
that used empirical data to persuade a court to uphold specific legislation. See Nesse &
Schlesinger, Justice Harry Blackmun and Empirical Jurisprudence, 29 AM. U. L. REv. 405,
405 n.2 (1980). The Muller brief dealt specifically with state regulation of maximum working
hours for women. 208 U.S. at 416-17.
2 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897).
3 Id.; see also Comment, Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of Nar-
cotics: On Finding That Winning Combination, 17 Hous. L. REv. 541, 550 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Constructive Possession] (suggested use of mathematics to weigh recurrent factors
in constructive possession cases to obtain consistent results).
' See generally M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 8 (1978) (since much
modern knowledge is expressed in large numbers, statistical analysis of data is necessary);
Markey, Science and Law-Towards A Happier Marriage, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 343, 349
(1977) (lawyers should use scientific data to gather and explain evidence); Nesse & Schle-
singer, supra note 1, at 411 (statistical evidence especially helpful in proving rational rela-
tion between specific statute and validity of state's objective); Reich, How To Evaluate an
Expert's Statistical Analysis, 28 PRAc. LAW. 69 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Reich] (resolu-
tion of factual issues necessitates statistical analysis); Constructive Possession, supra note
3, at 564 (empirical evidence helpful in interpreting large mass of data).
' See FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 15 (objective analysis often contradicts subjective
judicial decision); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L.
REv. 34, 36 (1979) (use of probability theory of statistics produces objective conclusions
thought more "logical" than subjective judicial decision); Nesse & Schlesinger, supra note 1,
at 406 (more consistent to have constitutional decisions based on statistical fact than on
judicial opinion); Constructive Possession, supra note 3, at 557 (use of probability theory to
rate factors relating to constructive possession of greater or lesser importance, providing
judges with a set of specific mathematical criteria). But see Doyle, Can Social Science Data
Be Used in Judicial Decisionmaking?, 6 J. OF LAW AND EDUC. 13, 18 (1977) (social science
data foreign to legal thought process, changeable and only slightly relevant to basic judicial
decisions).
' See Reich, supra note 4, at 74 (bias especially problematic with statistical data
founded on surveys); USING TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPERTS IN LITIGATION 60 (D. Zoeller
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as EXPERTS] (expert in federal court not required to testify
regarding basis of his opinion unless asked specifically on cross examination and then full
disclosure is dependent upon necessity to litigation and trustworthiness). See generally
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data's probative value,7 and the ease with which an attorney or statisti-
cian may manipulate the data.' These criticisms have not halted increas-
ing utilization of empirical data in the legal profession. Attorneys
employ varying forms of statistical evidence in antitrust law,9 criminal
law,10 constitutional law,1' employment discrimination litigation, 2
FED. R. EVID. 703 (data upon which expert opinion founded may be based upon hypothetical
question, observation of witness or other outside data not based upon expert's perception).
' See generally SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: AN EX-
PLORATORY DISCUSSION 128 (Nyart ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as DECISION-MAKING] (objec-
tions to use of scientific evidence typically based on prejudicial quality of evidence in con-
junction with confusing nature of data); Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372-74 (1971) (juror possibly convinced to ac-
quit or convict solely on basis of statistics, rather than other evidence).
' See infra text accompanying notes 178-181.
' See United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 89 (1975) (in an-
titrust litigation, statistics used to indicate market concentration prior to and following
merger); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 606-09 (1974) (same);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 489-98 (1974) (same); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 297 (1962) (same); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 652 F.2d 1324, 1341 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); cf. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (statistical analysis
helpful but not conclusive in determining effect of merger on market) modified, 584 F.2d
1195 (1978); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Lancaster Colony Corp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); see also infra text accompanying notes 62-73 (discussion of specific
antitrust case).
" See FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 263, 265 (examination of statistical evidence
reveals high rate of conviction largely due to pressure put on defendants in federal court to
plead guilty, despite weaknesses in prosecution's case); Brereton & Casper, Does It Pay to
Plead Guilty: Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 L. AND
SOCY REV. 45, 53-63 (1981) (examination of statistical evidence in three California counties
shows discernible difference in sentence length for defendants who plead guilty); Phillips,
Strong and Weak Research Designs For Detecting the Impact of Capital Punishment on
Homicide, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 790, 794 (1981) (criticism of studies showing deterrent effect
of death penalty based on lack of available cases, difference in various jurisdictions in
meting out capital punishment, and lack of short term current statistics). The seminal
criminal case using probability theory to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant is
People v. Collins. See 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); infra text accom-
panying notes 133-42. Probability theory has been suggested, however, as a way of quantify-
ing diverse factors in constructive possession of narcotics cases. See Constructive Posses-
sion, supra note 3, at 557 n.116. The theory proposed in Constructive Possession will
generate more consistent judicial decisions by assigning a numerical value to varying proba-
tive factors, so that judges may look at whether the product of the factors suggest probable
conviction. Id. at 560.
" See Nesse & Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 411 (empirical data used to express legal
tests such as "compelling state interest" more precisely); see also FINKELSTEIN, supra note
4, at 105 (proposing model for statistical analysis in voting cases used to test reapportion-
ment).
" See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (statistical
evidence of disporportion in class of people hired and those in surrounding community aided
plaintiff in establishing prima facie case of discrimination); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685
F.2d 743, 747 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. American
Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1178 (4th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 680 F.2d 965 (1982), cert. denied
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medical causation,13 and calculation of tort damages."
To facilitate analysis, formulation of a statistical argument may be
divided into four discernible phases. 5 The first phase concerns creation
of a plan to aid in the construction of a method of proving the attorney's
case." The second phase involves the collection of data, 7 while the third
step is selection of the type of analysis to apply to the data gathered. 8
The final stage in the use of empirical data is the preparation of a report
51 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 81-2358) (same); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); see also
text accompanying notes 27-60 (discussion of specific discrimination cases). See generally
Fourth Circuit Review-Statistical Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 652 (1982).
"3 See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1975). In
Karjala, the trial court allowed the plaintiff to introduce scientific evidence to show a link
between asbestosis and inhalation of asbestos fibers on the job. Id. at 157. The district court
in Karjala also allowed the plaintiff to introduce a scientific study which showed that defend-
ant corporation knew or should have known of the hazards relating to asbestos use. Id.; see
also Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the plaintiff introduced medical testimony linking inhalation of
asbestos dust to asbestosis. Id. at 1083. The testimony was based on a series of studies that
compared changes in the percentage of normal and abnormal X-rays for asbestos workers
over a number of years. Id. at 1085. The statistics showed that over a forty year period, the
percentage of the worker's abnormal X-rays increased from approximately ten to ninety-
four percent. Id. See generally Dickson, Medical Causation By Statistics, 17 FORUM 792
(1982) (judicial acceptance of use of statistical evidence to establish probability that plain-
tiffs' cervical cancer caused by mother's ingestion of DES during pregnancy); Gordon, The
Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 79, 91 n.72 (1965) (cause of harm to fetus determined by
statistical data). But see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964 n.3 (1978) (cause-and-effect relationship does not necessarily arise
from statistical relationship, since legal cause-in-fact requirement technically necessitates
understanding every phase of cancer development, not merely broad statistical assumption).
Recent developments in products liability have created another legal use for statistics.
When the plaintiff is unable to identify out of a large class of defendants the particular
defendant who caused the harm, some courts have sanctioned a theory of "market-share"
liability. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 558, 607, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 141-42, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (defendant's liability for plaintiffs
condition based upon percentage of DES sold by manufacturer in relation to entire produc-
tion of drugs sold by all manufacturers). See also Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer
to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REv. 668, 668-70 (1981) (workings of market
share analysis); Comment, Proof of Causation in Multiparty Drug Litigation, 56 TEx. L.
REV. 125, 132 n.50 (1977) (prior to Sindell, suggested use of market share theory to hold
defendant liable and set damages).
" See Murphy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 628 F.2d 862, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1980) (inflation
should be considered in calculating tort damages); Espana v. United States, 606 F.2d 41, 44
(2d Cir. 1980) (mortality tables used to figure award of damages); Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv.
Co., 559 F.2d 468, 474 (8th Cir. 1977) (inflation rate considered when computing damages).
,5 See Reich, supra note 4, at 70-75 (four phases of litigation involving statistics).
" Id. at 70-71.
'7 See id. at 71-72.
" See id. at 74. The attorney should attempt to learn why the expert used particular
statistical analysis to ascertain whether the data expressed through the analysis will be cor-
rect and a court should find the evidence probative. Id.
1983]
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or summary that will correlate the applicability of the proof offered to
the case at hand.'9
Expert mathematicians or statisticians figure prominently in-
creating a statistical argument for use in litigation." Nevertheless, the
attorney must motivate and guide the expert to form a successful
statistical argument. Therefore, the lawyer intending to use statistical
evidence should be aware of potential difficulties arising out of the use of
such evidence2 to minimize the danger of error in connection with the
use of empirical evidence.
The potential for mistake is present in all of the four previously
listed phases." The first stage particularly presents a problem because
the initial plan to aid in proof of the case will control later action taken
by the attorney and the expert.23 To avoid error in the formation of a
plan, the lawyer must consider whether the projected comparison ade-
quately correlates with the facts the attorney will prove2" and whether
the assumptions underlying the sample are correct.' Any mistakes made
in the planning stage could result in the presentation of an incorrect
comparison. Use of a spurious comparison could cause a court to reject
the statistical evidence. 6 In Hazelwood School District v. United
'9 See id. at 75 (either attorney or expert must attempt to explain specific statistical
relationship to factfinder); infra text accompanying notes 99-107 (importance of explaining
statistical relationship).
2 See Reich, supra note 4, at 70 (experts used in all phases of litigation to explain mat-
ters that ordinary factfinder might not understand); FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert testimony ad-
missible to assist trier of fact in understanding specialized discipline).
" See infra text accompanying notes 159-81.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
' See Reich, supra note 4, at 70.
24 See O'Neal v. Riceland Foods, No. 81-2397, (8th Cir. July 29, 1982). The plaintiffs
evidence in ONeal incorrectly compared minorities in a specific job to the minority popula-
tion at large. Id. The Eighth Circuit in 0 Neal held that a correct comparison would involve
only members of the minority population with qualifications for the job in question and
refused to find discrimination. Id.; see United States v. Wesevich, 666 F.2d 984, 990-91 (5th
Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit in Wesevich held that to properly defend a jury discrimination
case in the instant case, the government must compare actual jury venires to all members of
the Hispanic population, including Hispanics without Hispanic surnames. Id.; see United
States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 425-28 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 10Z S. Ct. 1282 (Jan. 25,
1982). Yazzie's evidence compared the total number of American Indians in the local popula-
tion to the number of Indians on local grand juries. Id. at 429. The Tenth Circuit held that a
correct statistical comparison would include only that part of the Indian population eligible
to vote, since jury venires are drawn from voter registration lists. Id.; see FINKELSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 12 (spurious correlation a problem in use of statistical evidence); DECISION-
MAKING, supra note 7, at 128 (statistics must be significant when applied to case cir-
cumstances).
' See Reich, supra note 4, at 71.
' See supra note 24 (courts holding incorrect statistical evidence irrelevant); infra text




States," a Title VII action,' the Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's rejection of the district court's statistical comparison. The Eighth
Circuit found data comparing a percentage of minority pupils to minori-
ty teachers irrelevant to show underrepresentation of minority teachers
in the school district." The Supreme Court remanded the case to correct
the statistical irrelevancy." The Court found that the comparison be-
tween the racial composition of the school district and the qualified
public school teacher population suggested by the Eighth Circuit would
provide the correct data for analysis by the district court.2
United States v. Yazziel provides another example of an incorrect
comparison. In Yazzie, the Tenth Circuit, discussing discrimination
against American Indians in grand jury selection, held that proper
statistical analysis would consider only that part of the American Indian
population qualified to vote, since voter registration lists form the grand
jury venire.1 Defendant Yazzie's evidence compared the entire percent-
age of Indians in the local population to the number of Indians serving on
grand juries. 5 The district court found the defendant's analysis inac-
curate" and suggested a comparison that the Tenth Circuit subsequently
held incorrect on review. 7 The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the
statistical disparities between qualified Indian grand jurors and actual
Indian grand jurors were not so marked as to reveal a substantial under-
representation of Indians.' Yazzie and Hazelwood indicate the close
433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood, the plaintiffs attempted to prove racial
discrimination in the school district's hiring system. Id. at 301. The government introduced
as evidence a statistical analysis that compared the number of minority pupils to minority
teachers. Id. at 301-04. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit correctly rejected
the data as irrelevant. Id. at 305. The Court stated that a correct comparison would instead
involve the racial composition of the qualified teaching population in the area. Id. at 308.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) 8 Supp. IV 1980. The congressional purpose in
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eradicate employment practices
that discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. Id. § 2000e-2. See generally Fourth Circuit Review-Statistical Evidence in Title
VllLitigation, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 652 (1982).
' See Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1976) (court supported Eighth
Circuit in finding district court's comparison irrelevant).
See supra note 27 (pupilteacher ratio not probative of teacher qualifications).
433 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 308.
660 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1981); see note 24 supra (factual discussion of Yazzie).
660 F.2d at 428.
SId.
Id. at 426-27. The district court in Yazzie rejected the plaintiff's statistics and
substituted a statistical figure based on Indians of voting age who had returned a question-
naire dealing with jury service to the state. Id. at 427. The Tenth Circuit found the district
court's proposed statistical figure inaccurate since only qualified people of voting age who
returned the questionnaire would be chosen. Id.
3 Id.
, Id. at 427-28.
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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
scrutiny that a court will use when examining statistical comparisons.
The attorney should be aware that a court will evaluate statistical
evidence critically and the lawyer therefore should judiciously evaluate
potential statistical comparisons when deciding which is correct.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically defined a "correct"
statistical comparison, an examination of incorrect comparisons clarifies
the meaning of the term "correct statistical comparison."" The Court
has rejected comparisons which are not mutually relevant, that is, com-
parisons that do not focus on the same issue," but the Supreme Court
has not stated the consequences of an incorrect comparison. In Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League," the Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's finding of discrimination and held that all
the statistical proof the plaintiffs offered was invalid.2 At the district
court level, plaintiffs ordered empirical data comparing the racial com-
position of the thirteen member panel that selected the school board to
the racial makeup of the population of Philadelphia." The district court
rejected the percentages as unreliable because the city charter
restricted the composition of the panel to the highest ranking officers of
various citywide organizations." The district court found that the discre-
tionary appointments the Mayor made to the panel could not give rise to
meaningful statistical comparisons." Despite the district court's holding,
the court of appeals found the small percentage of blacks on the panel to
be significant, concluding that the smallness of that number made
discrimination in appointment to the panel conceivable.46 The Supreme
I See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (two comparisons the Supreme Court
has held incorrect).
40 Id.
1 415 U.S. 605 (1974). Plaintiffs in Mayor alleged that the Mayor acted discriminatorily
in not placing a minority member on a thirteen member nominating board that selected the
school board. Id. at 608-09. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the Mayor and future
panels. Id. at 609.
41 See 415 U.S. 605, 610-21 (1974). The plaintiffs in Mayor relied on statistical evidence
concerning the racial makeup of the city's population, the student body and the nominating
panel. Id. at 610-11. Additionally, plaintiffs in Mayor attempted to illustrate a pattern of
discrimination by showing a low percentage of minorities in city government. Id. at 611-12.
The Court held that a correct statistical comparison would concern only those people eligi-
ble to serve on the nominating committee and the School Board itself. Id. at 620-21. The
Supreme Court doubted whether discretionary appointments lend themselves to statistical
analysis. Id. The Court also focused on the small sample size, finding that addition or sub-
traction of one Negro on the nominating panel would mean an eight percent change in the
plaintiffs statistics. Id. at 611.
'3 Id. at 610-11.
Id.; see Educational Equality League v. Tate, 333 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
modified, 472 F.2d 612 (1973), vacated 493 F.2d 1400 (1974) (few blacks in population eligible
for panel, reducing number of people in comparison).
"5 See supra note 32 (doubtful whether discretionary appointments subject to valid
statistical analysis).
" 415 U.S. at 620.
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Court reversed the circuit court, holding that the discretionary nature of
the appointments and the smallness of the sample size resulted in essen-
tially meaningless comparisons."
Following Mayor, the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States8 articulated a nebulous standard of rating
empirical effectiveness. The Court held that the usefulness of a
statistical analysis depends on surrounding facts and circumstances.
9
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the'result of an incorrect
comparison and subsequent decisions have not clarified the Court's posi-
tion. In Hazelwood, the government relied only partially on statistical
evidence to prove discriminatory hiring.50 The Court remanded the case
to the district court for an inquiry concerning the qualified minority
teacher population"' and to ascertain the relevant labor market.52 More
recently, in New York Transit Authority v. Beazer," former employees of
New York Transit Authority (TA) on a methadone-maintenance pro-
gram5 alleged discrimination in TA's employment exclusion of the
methadone users." The district court in Beazer found a Title VII viola-
tion in that TA's exclusionary policy exercised a discriminatory effect on
Hispanics and blacks. The district court relied on statistical evidence
concerning dismissal of employees suspected of violating TA's drug
policy and statistical evidence as to the racial background of all
methadone-maintained people in New York City. The Supreme Court
' Id. at 621; see note 4 supra (statistical analysis usually helpful with large numbers).
" 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, the Government brought a Title VII action, at-
tempting to prove discriminatory hiring practices against Negroes and Spanish surnamed
Americans. Id. at 328. The government relied on statistical evidence as well as personal
testimony. Id. at 339. The Court did not hold that statistical evidence alone could establish a
pattern or practice of discrimination, although the Court did place special emphasis on the
statistical data showing only .4% of Negroes employed by the company were lifle drivers
and only .3%/ of Hispanics employed by the company were line drivers. Id. at 337-40.
'9 Id. at 340.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood, the
government used the school board's past hiring practices, defendant's highly subjective hir-
ing procedures and specific instances of discrimination against fifty-five unsuccessful
minority applicants to prove discrimination in the school district. Id. at 301-03.
11 Id. at 313.
52 Id.
440 U.S. 568 (1979).
See 440 U.S. at 576. The Court in Beazer cited the district court findings that
methadone is a depressant, which is used legitimately in three ways. Id. at 573. Methadone
is used legitimately as a pain killer, as a means of lessening a drug addict's craving for
heroin, and as a cure for heroin addiction in long-range maintenance programs. Id.
" 440 U.S. at 570, 576-77. The New York Transit Authority (TA) maintains a general
policy against drug use without a prescription from TA's medical director. Id. at 572. The
Supreme Court stated that most of TA's 47,000 employees work in positions requiring ex-
treme alertness to avoid injury to themselves or to the public. Id. at 571.
" Id. at 578-79.
57 Id.
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found the district court erroneously relied on the statistical evidence."
The Court held that the data did not reflect actual employee dismissals
due to methadone-maintenance, nor did the evidence address the
number of people in the citywide methadone program who attempted to
work for TA.59 The Beazer Court therefore found the figures irrelevant
and held there was no Title VII violation.0
Since the Supreme Court has declined to express a definite standard
for use and evaluation of statistical evidence,"1 lower courts must decide
the validity of mathematical data on an ad hoc basis. For example, in
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,62 an
antitrust action,63 the Seventh Circuit stated merely that the empirical
data must be accurate and relevant.64 The Kaiser court analyzed United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.,5 in which the Supreme Court held
that empirical data concerning consolidation of the coal market after a
merger did not accurately predict prospective competitive conditions,
since the data compared past trends to future trends.6 The Government
in General Dynamics used statistical evidence based on past production
of coal rather than uncommitted reserves to support the assertion of an
anti-competitive violation. 7 The Court stated that mathematical
evidence, while highly meaningful, was not conclusive to show an-
' See id. at 584. The Beazer Court found that the district court's statistics did not
show an employment practice having the effect of denying either blacks or Hispanics equal
access to employment opportunities. Id. at 584-87.
09 Id. at 584-85.
o See id. at 587. The Beazer Court found that if the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case of discrimination, TA rebutted the case by illustrating that the narcotics rule was
related to job safety. Id.
"' See infra note 70 (statistical evidence helpful but not conclusive in antitrust cases);
but see supra note 12 (plaintiff may establish prima facie case of employment discrimination
through use of statistics).
652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981). In Kaiser, the plaintiff corporation sought relief from a
cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), resulting from
Kaiser's Aluminum & Chemical Corp.'s (Kaiser) acquisition of the Lavino Division of Inter-
national Minerals & Chemicals Corporation (Lavino). Id. at 1327. The FTC attempted to prove
through statistical data that Kaiser's acquisition of Lavino would lessen competition in the
plaintiff corporation's specific market. Id. at 1327-41. The Seventh Circuit held that
statistical evidence introduced at trial must be "accurate and relevant." Id. at 1340-41.
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) 8 Supp. V 1981 (Clayton Act). The salient portion of the
Clayton Act states that no corporation under the jurisdiction of the FTC shall acquire
another corporation if the acquisition lessens competition or creates a monopoly. Id.
64 652 F.2d 1324, 1340 (7th Cir. 1981).
" 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The Government in General Dynamics attempted to require
divestiture of a strip mining coal corporation by a deep shaft coal mining corporation. Id. at
488-90. The Government introduced evidence of past production statistics that the Court
held did not relate to future coal consumption. Id. at 491.
Id. at 491.
6 See supra note 65 (in antitrust suit the Court held that when company sets prices
long term, best evidence of competition is based on reserve figures, rather than post pro-
duction figures).
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ticompetitive effects. 8 The Court then found no antitrust violation. 9 The
Seventh Circuit also examined cases subsequent to General Dynamics to
evaluate the weight given statistical evidence. 0 The Kaiser court held
that General Dynamics requires a defendant to rebut the Government's
prima facie case with statistical evidence that shows no lessening of com-
petition.7' The Seventh Circuit ultimately interpreted General Dynamics
as applying to statistical measurement of inaccurate economic factors. 2
Thus, the court of appeals found accurate statistical evidence reliable




The circuits appear to hold that while statistical evidence is import-
ant, a court must examine the data in context with other evidence to
determine the probative value of the evidence.74 In Yazzie v. United
States,75 the Tenth Circuit examined the difference between the
statistics sanctioned by the district court and the correct statistical com-
415 U.S. at 491.
6' Id. at 498. The Court found General Dynamic's "failing company" defense inap-
plicable. Id. at 505. The "failing company" defense requires a finding by the trier of fact that
the company being taken over had rapidly dwindling reserves that would prevent the
takeover corporation from monopolizing the market. Id. at 507.
11 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 652 F.2d 1324,
1332-37 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-22 (1962)
(statistics regarding control of market helpful, but not conclusive in determining violation of
Clayton Act § 7); cf. United States v. Citizen's & Southern Nat'l. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 121
(1975) (defendants may rebut inaccurate analysis of effect of merger on future markets);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974) (same).
"' See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 652 F.2d 1324, 1340
(7th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1339-40.
, Id. at 1340. The Kaiser court stated that although an appellant may come forward
with statistics rebutting the government's prima facie case of a lessening of competition,
the government still bears the burden of persuasion. Id. at 1340. The Seventh Circuit found
that the appellant does not have to persuade the trier of fact that the appellant is entitled to
relief. Id.
"' See Yazzie v. United States, 660 F.2d 422, 427-28 (10th Cir. 1981) (when district
court's comparison taken in relation to Tenth Circuit's comparison, statistical disparity not
great enough to cause finding of discrimination); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n., 652 F.2d 1324, 1340 (7th Cir. 1981) (government's statistical
evidence rebuttable by defendant); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United
Virginia Bank Seaboard Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1980) (statistical evidence proba-
tive in Title VII litigation, but court will view in context of other evidence), reh'g denied,
680 F.2d 965 (1982); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ext. Serv., 528 F.2d 508, 517 (5th Cir. 1976)
(although court found statistical evidence overly confusing court found other evidence ex-
isted to support discrimination claim).
75 660 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. In Yaz-
zie, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against him on the grounds that the
New Mexico grand and petit jury venires through racial underrepresentation denied de-
fendant's equal protection rights as well as the right to a jury drawn from a cross section of
the community. Id. at 424. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and defendant
Yazzie appealed. Id.
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parison.7 The Tenth Circuit found the disparity between the two sets of
comparisons to be so slight" that the circuit court upheld the validity of
the district court's conclusion.78 The court of appeals thus affirmed the
district court's decision holding no discrimination in New Mexico grand
juries.79 Despite the fact that in Yazzie the change in comparison did not
affect the ultimate outcome of the case," an attorney should use com-
parisons that are relevant to the issue to be proved. This may be done by
using a comparison group with similar or identical characteristics to the
group at issue in the suit, or by projecting a future occurrence rather
than relying on past events. Notwithstanding the fact that a correct
statistical comparison may not result in the most favorable
mathematical data, use of an anomalous correlation usually will result in
remand or reversal.81
Problems of a different nature inhere in the second and fourth steps,
the collection and interpretation of data. Unless previously collected
data is used,82 an expert should control this phase to insure reliability.'
Empirical evidence amassed for trial generally is admissible at trial.84
Additionally, the expert's background information may be subject to
pretrial discovery." Discoverability is largely dependent upon the ex-
pert's relationship to the attorney.88 If the expert is considered the at-
torney's advisor and consultant then the expert's materials are con-
sidered part of the attorney's work product and therefore not
7 660 F.2d at 427. The district court in Yazzie suggested the use of a comparison be-
tween the percentage of the Indian population over the voting age and the percentage of In-
dians returning a jury qualification questionnaire. Id. at 427. The Tenth Circuit opined that
the district court should have compared the percentage of Indians who returned the ques-
tionnaires with the percentage who actually qualified to sit on a jury. Id.
" See infra note 76.
660 F.2d at 427-28. In Yazzie, the disparity between the results of the district court's
suggested comparisons and the Tenth Circuit's was only twenty-four hundredths of a per-
cent for the petit jury figures and thirteen hundredths of a percent for the grand jury. Id. at
427.
7' See supra note 74.
'o See supra note 76 (appellate court in Yazzie upheld district court finding of no
discrimination).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 49-59 (effect of incorrect comparisons on out-
come of cases).
82 See Reich, supra note 4, at 72 (examples of previously collected data include census
reports and jury venires).
" See id. at 73 (if expert merely designed the study and relied on others to gather
data, evidence introduced at trial would have less credibility).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (all nonprivileged materials relevant to litigation are
discoverable, unless excluded under FED. R. EVID. 403).
1 See EXPERTS, supra note 6, at 129; FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) (sanctioning extensive
amounts of pretrial discovery). But see Weitort v. A. H. Bull & Co., 192 F. Supp. 165, 167-68
n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (when third party defendant's expert witness would testify only to the
same facts as previously discoverable witnesses, expert may not be subject of discovery).
See infra notes 87, 88.
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discoverable.' If the court considers the expert merely to be the at-
torney's witness, then work product exceptions do not apply and the
materials are discoverable.8
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,89 the court affirmed the
magistrate's order to the defendant's attorneys to turn over to the plain-
tiffs the defendant's expert's interim reports, appointment book, time
sheets, and a summary of materials used to prepare the case ° The Sec-
ond Circuit without comment sanctioned the extensive scope of
discovery.9 If the attorney does not want the expert's work product
discovered prior to trial, then the attorney should attempt to establish
an advisory relationship between the two. 2
One an expert has been retained, but still prior to trial, additional
difficulties exist in the preparation of the evidence. The possibility of
bias entering into the data via an expert's personal preferences is a ma-
jor concern connected with the data gathering stage. 3 When the expert
gathers new data for presentation at trial,94 the material is elicited totally
under the expert's aegis. If any bias existed, opposing counsel cannot
compensate for the expert's prejudice. Cross examination, the usual
method employed to insure fairness at trial,95 serves the intended pur-
pose only if the attorney has the information necessary to formulate an
effective cross.8 The expert's bias enters into the data at a stage when
' See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947) (attorney's own work product non-
discoverable), cert denied, 336 U.S. 906 (1949); EXPERTS, supra note 6, at 129 (discoverabili-
ty of expert's work product depends upon distinction in status as witness or advisor).
" See EXPERTS, supra note 6, at 130 (if court finds expert is lawyer's representative,
then expert may invoke attorney-client privilege).
- 603 F.2d 263, 305-07 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). In Berkey
Photo, an antitrust action, the magistrate ordered the expert witness for the defense to
give the bulk of the defense's pretrial preparation to the plaintiff's attorneys. Id. at 305.
See id. In Berkey, plaintiff's attorney used discoverable material to impeach the
defense's expert witness. Id. at 307. The Second Circuit held that when the trial court judge
carefully balanced the prejudicial and probative value of the evidence, the court of appeals
would not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 305.
See supra note 87 (nondiscoverability of expert's materials is result of establishing
an advisory relationship with attorney, that relationship being any one where expert is used
beyond capacity as witness).
"5 See Nesse & Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 408 (empirical studies often reflect biases
of researchers); Reich, supra note 4, at 74 (attorney must be satisfied that all data, especially
survey data, is collected in unbiased manner); DECISION-MAKING, supra note 7, at 128 (after
data collection, when expert interprets data, expert's bias may unduly influence the trier of
fact).
" See supra note 93.
'5 See FED. R. EVID. 811 advisory committee note (cross-examination used to counter
faults in witness's perception, memory, and narration).
" See FED. R. EvID. 705 (expert not required to disclose data underlying conclusions,
but attorney may elicit information on cross-examination). The advisory committee notes to
the Federal Rules of Evidence imply that cross-examiners will be able to formulate effective
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an opposing attorney would have no way of knowing that such prejudice
exists.97 To preclude partiality, the supervising attorney should attempt
to keep a statistician's potential bias in check. 8
The fourth stage in using empirical data is the preparation of a
report or summary regarding the data gathered in the second stage.99
Some form of summarization is necessary, because the data gathered by
the expert may establish relationships, but will not explain those rela-
tionships.' 0 For example, in an employment discrimination case under
Title VII, an expert could correlate data contrasting a high minority
population in a qualified work force with low minority hiring by a given
employer.' The information establishes a relationship between the
minority work force available and the number of minorities employed.'
The data does not state the conclusion that an employer utilized illegal
discriminatory hiring practices. The employer may have a defense if the
discrimination discernible in the statistics stems largely from pre-Act hir-
ing practices.' In an employment discrimination case, the attorney
cross-examination. FED. R..EvID. 705 advisory committee note; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)
(allowing liberal discovery in any non-privileged area relevant to litigation). See generally
Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (1962).
"' See Reich, supra note 4, at 72 (bias especially difficult to discover if data gathered
during survey because expert's bias could be unidentifiable factor, such as tone of voice).
"' See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-28 (1981) (lawyer must exer-
cise reasonable diligence to ensure that witnesses testify truthfully).
" See Reich, supra note 4, at 73 (report necessary to explain relationships indicated by
statistics).
10 Id.
01 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 304 (1977) (allegation of
discrimination based on high minority population in hiring area contrasted with low minori-
ty hiring); infra note 99 (discussion of Supreme Court's findings in Hazelwood).
,0I See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-09 (1971). In
Hazelwood, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a finding of the
proper labor market area from which prospective minority school teachers applied. Id. at
313. If the labor market was the County of St. Louis, the difference between minority
teachers hired and qualified minority teachers would be less than two standard deviations.
Id. at 311 n.17. If the labor market encompassed St. Louis and the County of St. Louis the
difference would be over five standard deviations. Id. The use of the numbers above creates
a relationship between the comparisons, but does not establish a pattern or practice of
discrimination. Id. at 312-13.
103 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977); Evans v.
United Airlines, 431 U.S. 553, 556-58 (1977); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 748-49
(1st Cir. 1982). The Hazelwood Court held that the school district could rebut the discrimina-
tion alleged by the Government by showing that the discrimination resulted from pre-Act
hiring. 433 U.S. at 311. Similarly, in Evans, the Court held that the relevant time period for
applying statistical evidence began with the effective date of Title VII. 431 U.S. at 557. The
First Circuit in Lamphere held that evidence of pre-Act violations may show a pattern or
practice of behavior with regard to independent violations occuring after 1972, the year in
which Title VII became applicable to educational institutions. 685 F.2d 743, 747 (1st Cir.
1982). See generally Schoeman, Understanding the Role of Statistical Evidence in Equal
Employment Opportunity Law, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 136-38 (1982) (evidence of pre-Act violations
admissible to show pattern as practice of discriminatory behavior).
[Vol. 40:313
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
would attempt to link statistical or other evidence of discrimination to
present employer action. For example, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,'0 4 the government supported statistical data
with personal testimony of recent employer behavior." 5 The Court found
the use of personal testimony effective in proving the government's
case,0 6 and ultimately found discrimination in the employer's practices.'
The attorney's role in the fourth phase is to offer explanations for
statistical relationships that establish the applicability of statistical
evidence to the case.
Although the expert fulfills a pivotal role in the third stage, in
amassing and interpreting data, the attorney must convey the informa-
tion to the trier of fact. The attorney should be familiar with the type of
analysis used so as to facilitate the fact finder's understanding. Two dif-
ferent types of statistical analysis have been the subject of legal com-
mentary.' Statisticians use the standard deviation analysis to compare
actual events to a hypothetical set of events. 9 The results will often "
determine whether the actual events occurred by chance or by design."'
10 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see supra note 48 (discussion of factual situation in Teamsters).
"05 See 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, the government relied on statistical evidence
and the personal testimony of individual truck drivers who enumerated approximately forty
specific instances of discrimination. Id. at 338.
1 See id. The Supreme Court in Teamsters stated that individual testimony brought
the statistical evidence to life. Id. at 339.
"I See id. at 339. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court relied on several factors to support
a finding of discrimination. Id. at 339. The Teamsters Court considered the government's
statistical evidence showing large percentages of minorities in low paying jobs, individual
testimony of discrimination, and the employer's continuing post-Act discriminatory hiring
practices. Id. at 337-41.
"' See FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 9 (suggesting that probability theory applies to
various legal areas including guilty pleas, voting, wrongful death actions, and jury
discrimination); KERLINGER, Foundations of Behavioral Research 161-64 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Kerlinger] (description of standard deviation); Doyle, supra note 5, at 13 (1977)
(statistical data most helpful in fashioning remedies in constitutional cases); Kaplan, Deci-
sion Theory and the Fact Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Kaplan] (looks to benefits and problems of decision theory); Lempert, Modeling
Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977) (supports use of probability theory in law);
Tribe, supra note 7, at 1372-76 (criticizing use of probability theory in court); Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, Book Review, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 116, 117 (1978) (reviewing FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 4, and concluding probability theory not satisfactory when used in court).
See infra text accompanying notes 115-129 (standard deviation).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 26-37 (statistics resulting from incorrect com-
parison irrelevant).
"I See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977). Casteneda, the leading case
on standard deviation analysis, involved an allegation of discrimination in jury selection. Id.
at 485. The Supreme Court held that as part of petitioner's prima facie case, petitioner must
show the degree of racial underrepresentation on a grand jury by comparing the proportion
of the racial group in the total population to those called to serve as grand jurors. Id. at 494.
The Supreme Court discussed the correct formula for determining standard deviation and
concluded that a standard deviation greater than two or three would favor the proposition
that the event under discussion did not occur by chance. Id. at 496 n.17. In Moultrie v. Mar-
tin, the Fourth Circuit extended the Supreme Court's discussion of standard deviation
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The second type of analysis, decision or probability theory, gives a
numerical value to the evidence heard in court, rather than presenting
external evidence. " 2 An attorney or statistician using probability theory
hopes to establish a firm foundation for civil or criminal liability by add-
ing up all the percentages assigned the evidence at trial."' While
American courts generally accept standard deviation analysis, pro-
ponents of probability theory have been less successful in persuading
courts to admit statistical evidence based on probability theory."'
Standard deviation analysis rests on the theory that chance events
in large numbers will distribute themselves in the shape of a curve. " 5 A
normal probability curve is bell shaped with approximately equal
numbers on either side of the center point. " 6 That mid-point is called the
analysis in Castaneda by holding that all courts in the circuit must apply Castaneda's
Supreme Court sanctioned analysis. 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982).
I See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1351. The probability theory looks for the answer to
P(XIE)-the probability of X event given E evidence. Proceeding on the assumption that a
juror, for example, has a preconceived notion of PX), probability theory provides a formula
to weight the initial expectation of truth or falsehood with subsequenty elicited evidence.
Id. The probability of X, given E equals P(E + X) = P(E/X)oP(X). The theory intends to
PE P(E).
accord more precise weight to evidence that will vary in degree with the factfinder's evalua-
tion of the trust of the evidence. Id. By quantifying the thought process, the factfinder
theoretically is better able to incorporate mathematical and nonmathematical evidence into
the scheme of a decision. Id. at 1350. All terminology (P,X,E) and formulae borrowed from
Professor Tribe for purposes of clarity.
"I See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 325, 438 P.2d 33, 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501
(1968) (prosecution attempted to prove robbery by probability theory); infra note 138 (dis-
cussion of characteristics and probabilities used by Collins prosecutor).
114 See infra note 193 (courts usually disallow use of probability theory because of pre-
judice or confusion to jury).
Il See KERLINGER, supra note 108, at 162 (basic standard deviation principle).
50
IQ 52 68 84 100 116 132 148
(z) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
16 The curve above is a normal bell shaped curve based on a random data sample for
purposes of illustration only. KERLINGER, supra note 108, at 162. The mean, or average is the
midpoint from the baseline of the curve. Id. On this graph, sixteen points (100-116)
represents a standard deviation of one, thirty-two represents a standard deviation of two,
each deviation increasing by sixteen. Id.
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average, or mean.'17 The standard deviation reflects the percentage of
times an event will occur with greater or less frequency than the
average.' For example, when formulating a graph in a jury selection
discrimination case, the range of numbers of minority jurors that have
sat on a grand jury in the past would comprise the horizontal axis."' The
horizontal axis represents the dependent variable, the variable that does
not change.12 Since a finite number of minority grand jurors exists, that
range would be placed along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis lays
out frequencies of occurrence, or the potential number of times a minority
member could have been a grand jury member. The difference between
the expected value (the potential number of minority jurors) and the
observed number (the actual number of minority jurors) will result in the
standard deviation.2 ' Generally accepted statistical practices'22 dictate
that standard deviations falling within a range of one to three indicate
events that possibly transpired by pure chance.' In a discrimination
case, a standard deviation of less than three would suggest that exclu-
sion of a minority member was not a deliberate act.2 4 The Supreme
Court has held that if the standard deviation exceeds three, then the
possibility is slight that the results are a product of chance."
The relationship between the two axes depends on the size of the
sample.'28 Statisticians calculate the deviation by the area properties of
the curve. Thus, the slighter the curve, the more difficult the deviations
are to ascertain, and the less accurate the evidence becomes.'" The
smaller the sample, the larger the resulting deviations.'28 Therefore, the
' See KERLINGER, supra note 108, at 161.
11 See id. at 162.
118 See id.
' See KERLINGER, supra note 108, at 162.
II See id. at 163; F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS, PROBABILITY WITH
STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS, 302-05 (2d ed. 1970). On a normal curve, a deviation of one is
equal to approximately 68%, a standard deviation of two is equal to approximately 96% and
a standard deviation of three is equal to approximately 99%. The various percentages
equated with a specific standard deviation are the result of a basic equation that is not rele-
vant for the purposes of this note.
12 See supra notes 26-37 (Supreme Court citation of statistical practice of looking to
greater than three standard deviations as deliberate action).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 33-38 (finding of no discrimination due to low
standard deviation).
"' See supra note 110 (statistics resulting from incorrect comparison also cannot form
basis of finding deliberate act).
"' See supra note 196 (Supreme Court holding that greater than two or three standard
deviations is not result of chance).
128 See KERLINGER, supra note 108, at 161-64. If a large series of numbers form the sam-
ple, a statistician will find it easier to determine the standard deviation. Id. The curve will
be larger, thereby creating a more visible difference in the horizontal and vertical axes. Id.
12 See infra note 130 (small sample results in inaccuracy unless readjusted).
"' See supra note 47 and accompanying text (smallness of nominating panel in Mayor
would cause addition or subtraction of a black member to change statistics by eight
percent).
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Supreme Court has declined to, consider empirical data elicited from a
small sample because of the inherent inaccuracy of the data."
A court will refuse to find statistical data probative if the data is
based on a small sample' or an incorrect comparison.' Courts will,
however, accept the use of the standard deviation analysis when an at-
torney proffers correct statistical evidence."3 2 Given accurate use of the
evidence, courts do not question the validity of the standard deviation
analysis. Judicial approval of standard deviation analysis directly con-
trasts with the attitude toward the second theory mathematicians have
proposed for use in the courtroom. Bayes' Theorem'33 is a probability
theory that attempts to quantify the human thought process in an effort
to persuade a fact finder to think more logically.'34 When Bayes' Theory
is used, either an attorney or a statistician working with the attorney
will assign numerical values to various pieces of evidence. 3 ' The values
represent the weight that a fact finder should give the evidence as part
of the totality of an attorney's case."'
People v. Collins'37 is an example of the attempted use of the con-
troversial Bayes' Theorem. In Collins, the Supreme Court of California
overruled the trial court's admission of a set of cumulative data."8 The
court found that the "product rule"'3 9 used by the prosecution was inap-
" See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621 (1974)
(Supreme Court cast doubt upon validity of statistics relating to thirteen member panel);
Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975) (statistical evidence
based on number of women in one small office held invalid for comparison because too small
a universe).
"' See Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1083 (4th Cir. 1982) (precision and depend-
ability of statistics directly related to sample size). Population samples of less than thirty or
forty are considered too small for the purposes of standard deviation analysis. Id. at 1083
n.7.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 27-37 (cases employing incorrect statistical com-
parisons).
13. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147,
150-51 (4th Cir. 19801, reh'g denied, 680 F.2d 965 (1982) (statistical evidence held correct and
not grounds for a rehearing).
'" See Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1043. Developed by the Reverend Thomas Bayes in
1763, probability theory lay fallow for approximately two hundred years before reemerging.
Id.
134 See FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 15 (emphasis on totaling probabilities and basing
conclusions on numbers more rational than decision based on emotion).
See infra note 141 (assignment of values to evidence by prosecutor in Collins case).
,3' See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1350 (theory attempts to give values to individual juror's
assessment of truth of a piece of evidence).
137 See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 326, 438 P.2d 33, 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500
(1968 (prosecution attempted to prove identity in robbery case by totalling characteristics
of defendant couple to show improbability of another couple possessing identical
characteristics).
" See id. at 332, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (reversing defendant's robbery
conviction because of prejudice resulting from use of incorrect statistical evidence). But see
Fairley & Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 242, 244 (1974)
(California Supreme Court's analysis as erroneous as the prosecution's in Collins).
,31 See Kingston & Kirk, The Use of Statistics in Criminalistics, 55 J. CRIM. LAW,
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plicable and distorted the jury's fact finding ability."' The Collins pros-
ecutor had attempted to prove the defendants' commission of a robbery
by compiling a list of the defendants' physical characteristics and assign-
ing each characteristic a value."' The prosecutor then totaled the prob-
abilities of all the characteristics and established a one in twelve million
chance that a couple other than the defendants committed the crime."'
The Supreme Court of California looked at a series of logical flaws in the
trial court's decision"' and held that no empirical evidence existed to
support the prosecutor's initial match of probabilities with defendants'
physical characteristics."4 Further, the Collins court noted that the in-
terdependence of all the characteristics the prosecution selected caused
the product of the characteristics to yield a much higher probability sum
than would result with independent factors."' Finally, the California
Supreme Court noted that a substantial likelihood existed that the
defendants did not possess all the characteristics the prosecution im-
puted to them.4 '
CRIMINOLOGY, POLICE SCIENCE 514, 516 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kingston] (product or
multiplication rule takes independent -factors, assigns numerical probability to them, and
determines probability of the whole by multiplying all the percentages together).
14' The Collins court found the jurors to be impressed by statistical evidence, but
unable to assess its value or relevancy. 68 Cal. 2d at 332, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
"4I See id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501. The prosecution in Collins made a
list of six characteristics of the defendants. Id. With these, the prosecution coordinated in-
dividual probabilities to be totalled for the result. Id
Characteristics Individual Probability
A. Partly yellow automobile 1110
B. Man with moustache 1/4
C. Girl with ponytail 1/10
D. Girl with blonde hair 1/3
E. Negro man with beard 1/10
F. Interracial couple in car 1/1000
142 See id. at 327, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
143 See id. at 328, 438 P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The California Supreme Court
cited the lack of statistical and evidentiary foundation for the expert's testimony as well as
distortion of jury function by presenting the jury with a mathematical determination of
defendant's guilt as reasons for overturning the defendant's conviction. Id. at 328, 438 P.2d
at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
'" See id. at 327, 438 P.2d -at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The prosecution in Collins made
no attempt to introduce evidence that the probabilities used were accurate. Id. at 327, 438
P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The prosecutor stated that the probabilities selected were
conservative and encouraged the jury to plug in different probabilities. Id. at 328, 438 P.2d
at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
"' See id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500. The state's expert testified that
the product rule gave the probability of an event's occurrence as the sum of all the in-
dividual parts. Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500. The California Supreme Court
noted that use of independent characteristics is essential to the function of the product rule,
otherwise the equation will lead to an exaggerated result. Id. at 328, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal.
Rptr. at 503; see supra note 139 (definition of product rule).
"' See 68 Cal. 2d at 321-22, 438 P.2d at 34-35, 66 Cal. Rptr. 498-99. The California
Supreme Court noted testimonial discrepancies in the description of the color and size of the
defendant's car, the color of the female subject's hair and whether the male suspect had a
moustache and beard. Id. at 321-22, 438 P.2d at 34-35, 66 Cal. Rptr. 498-99. The defendant ad-
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The Collins case illustrates two147 of the main imperfections in Bayes'
Theorem. The first problem is in setting an initial value for the probability
(represented by P) of the given occurrence at trial (represented by X)."
Using PMX) to symbolize the trier's primary expectation of truth or
falsehood regarding that event, many fact finders will not have an initial
conception of guilt or innocence definite enough to quantify. " 9 Addi-
tionally, for two triers of fact unfamiliar with statistics, the same percent-
age of probability could elicit two different results. If the probabilities
totalled fifty percent, one juror could find that figure to convey probable
guilt while another juror could assume probable innocence.5°
The second difficulty with Bayes' Theorem concerns the interrela-
tion of the evidence. If a value is assignable to the trier's initial concep-
tion of truth or falsehood (P(X)), a fact finder must have used some form
of evidence (E) to arrive at that primary conclusion. 5 ' The result of this
interrelation is that every piece of evidence diminishes or increases the
value of every other piece of evidence in mathematical proportion.52 The
mathematical effect of this interrelation differs from the normal function
of evidence at trial. Usually, evidence adduced at trial will help a fact
finder to achieve a verdict based on the fact finder's individual percep-
ditionally attempted to impeach the prosecution's witness by showing that at the
preliminary hearing, the witness testified to a doubtful identification of the male defendant
at a lineup, and that the victim could not identify the female defendant and had never seen
the male. Id. at 321, 438 P.2d at 34, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
... See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1358-69. Although the Collins court focused on two of the
problems cited by commentators in connection with the probability theory, the difficulty in
selecting initial probabilities and the interdependence of the factors, Professor Tribe
discusses five basic difficulties with Bayesian Theory. First, the difficulty in assigning a
value to an individual's concept of guilt or innocence is problematical because a trier usually
will be unable to accurately assess the concept of guilt or innocence without using other
evidence. Id. at 1358. A typical juror's unfamiliarity with statistics exacerbates the previous
difficulty. Id. The second problem Professor Tribe indicates is the difficulty in putting a
specific type of proof into a quantified general theory. Id. at 1360. Third, the author points
to the highly prejudicial character of statistical evidence. Id. Professor Tribe states that the
perceived logic inherent in a numerical formula could dwarf other types of evidence. Id. at
1361-62. Fourth, the statistical evidence tends to lend itself to the asking of specific ques-
tions, ignoring legal elements of knowledge or intent, which are nonquantitative factors. Id.
at 1366. Finally, Tribe illustrates the problem with interdependent variables. The difficulty
is that a factfinder cannot consider one element of proof alone for purposes of quantification.
Id. at 1368. This affects the product of the variables, increasing the product to the extent of
the interdependence.
.48 See id. at 1358. The trier's initial conception of truth or falsehood is difficult to quan-
tify, due to the nebulousness of the perception. Id.
.49 See id.
,s Id. at 1358-59.
See id. at 1368. A juror begins a trial with an initial presumption of guilt or in-
nocence resulting from a primary application of some evidence. Id. at 1350. Each new piece
of evidence is added to the initial calculation, which may never be made independently of
other evidence. Id.
" See supra note 139 (definition of product rule and result of interrelation of evidence).
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tion of the evidence as a whole and is subject to revision during trial.
With probability theory, however, the values equated to the evidence
may or may not reflect the trier of fact's perception of the evidence,
either initially, or as the trial progresses."3 Further, the user may not ap-
ply the theory sequentially since all the factors are interdependent. If, as
the California Supreme Court found in Collins, the defendant does not
possess the characteristics imputed to him, the entire equation is incor-
rect, because the probative value of the equation depends upon the
validity of each of the individual factors.s The California Supreme Court
in Collins stated that not only was it probable that the defendants did
not possess all of the characteristics designated by the prosecutor but
that several of the characteristics overlapped, causing an already defec-
tive equation to become more suspect.155 Interdependency also causes a
problem with the resulting length of the equation.156 A formula con-
ceivably could become so complicated that a juror might be incapable of
comprehending the equation.57 In such a case, a juror might be inclined
to give great weight to statistics, rather than question the mathematical
data's probative value. Blind adherence to statistical evidence thus could
result in a prejudicial over reliance on empirical evidence.5
Once an attorney has assembled the data and chosen a theory, the at-
torney faces separable difficulties inherent in the use of statistics as
evidentiary tools. Evidentiary use of statistics requires sublimation of
mathematical discipline to legal discipline in an attempt to gauge verbally
a nonverbal study. A lawyer wishing to introduce statistical evidence
must initially decide the most advantageous method of introduction. The
,5 See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1350. Professor Tribe explained the thought process a
juror undergoes. Id. The juror continually modifies an initial perception of guilt or in-
nocence in light of later discovered evidence. Id. The factfinder accords the evidence
greater or lesser weight according to the factfinder's evaluation of the truth of the proposi-
tion. Id. Probability theory weighs the likelihood of an event's occurrence, not a factfinder's
perception of truth. Id.
,u See supra note 112 (product of individual factors gives result of equation).
,' See 68 Cal. 2d at 328, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503. The California Supreme
Court stated that interdependence of factors would yield an exaggerated result. Id. at 328,
439 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503. The court argued specificially that Negro men with
beards and men with moustaches were actually one category and that to correct any
discrepancy caused by interdependence a-statistician would need to know the degree of in-
terdependence. Id. at 328 n.15, 438 P.2d at 39 n.15, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.15.
'" See id. at 328 n.14, 438 P.2d at 39 n.14, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.14 (statistics not in-
terdependent when occurrence or nonoccurrence of one trait does not affect another).
157 See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1368. But see id. at 1354 (Tribe recognized possible solu-
tion to overly complicated formulae would allow mathematical experts to come into court
and explain significance of statistics); DECISION-MAKING, supra, note 7, at 120-23 (suggestions
for dealing with complicated scientific data include use of a special science magistrate, ad-
visory jury made of jurors with minimum scientific qualifications, scientific expert as aide to
judge, or issue resolver).
'" See infra text accompanying notes 177-78 (jury unable to assess value of statistical
evidence at trial).
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attorney' may request that the court take judicial notice of the
evidence"5 9 or may make use of appropriate expert testimony.6 ' To
qualify for judicial notice, a scientific fact must be of such widespread ac-
ceptance as to be considered general knowledge. '61 Expert testimony
regarding scientific evidence, on the other hand, must be based upon
facts accepted only within the scientific community. '62 The simpler
method of introduction then, is through an expert, since the standard of
proof is lower. Arguably, judicial notice is simpler and a more economic
use of court time. Judicial notice will prove to be advantageous,
however, only if the evidence sought to be introduced is of common
knowledge.
After the lawyer has successfully introduced statistical evidence,
commentator's traditional objections center around the data's lack of
relevance and indefinite probative value, the suspect qualifications of
the offeror, the bias of the statistician, and the misdirection of statistical
analysis."3 Commentators primarily criticize the use of expert witnesses
based on potential bias or a lack of qualification."' A common fear is that
the opposing attorney may not be able to reveal an expert's bias at trial
if such bias exists.'65 Realizing that the preconceptions with which an ex-
pert collects data color the conclusions, an attorney would need to be
aware of a bias to correct the effect of the evidence. The opposing at-
torney may mitigate the effect of bias if the opposing attorney can show
that a statistician is not qualified to answer certain questions or would
be unable.to answer due to factors inherent in the discipline.' In People
v. Collins, for example, the expert mathematician refused to aid the prose-
cutor in setting the probabilities because the numbers had no
mathematical basis.6 ' Since an opposing side's expert will not always
59 See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (introduction by judicial notice of fact known within
jurisdiction of trial court or capable of accurate determination by outside source).
.. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert testimony introduced to aid trier of fact understand-
ing evidence or determining facts in issue).
.6, See FED. R. EvID. 201(b) (fact must be capable of accurate determination by outside
source); Experts, supra note 4, at 130 (fact must be of general common knowledge).
62 See FED. R. EVID. 703 (basis of expert testimony does not have to be admissible into
evidence if of type relied upon by experts in particular field); see also Frye v. United States,
293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (court disallowed systolic blood pressure test measuring
witnesses' truthfulness due to test's lack of acceptance in general scientific community).
I" See infra text accompanying notes 6-8 (traditional objections to statistics).
... See Decision-Making, supra note 7, at 128 (list of traditional objections to scientific
evidence).
" See supra text accompanying notes 93-98 (discussion of problem with expert's bias).
166 See United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Seventh Circuit stated that the defendant has a constitutional right to challenge
whatever evidence is admitted. Id. The defendant may challenge expert testimony through
cross-examination, clarification of misleading testimony, and use of a defense expert. Id.




voluntarily admit a disqualifying factor, an attorney might be prepared
to ask whether the expert is aware of any impediment in answering a
particular question. Knowledge of bias or inherent limitation is important
because of the precision associated with mathematics. A jury confronted
with masses of statistical evidence conceivably could convict or find
liability despite a reasonable doubt propounded by nonstatistical
evidence. Collins illustrated that a jury faced with highly circumstantial
nonstatistical evidence, but innundated with incorrect empirical data,
could convict probably innocent defendants.'68 The highly convincing
nature of empirical data forces a court to consider the efficacy of the
mathematical formula to ensure that the defendant receives a fair
trial. 69
In addition to being prejudicial, statistical evidence is often a confus-
ing tool.' Two experts could look to identical data and reach opposite
conclusions.' If skilled statisticians cannot reach agreement concerning
the significance of the data, an unskilled jury would most probably be
unable to reach an accurate resolution. The amount of evidence and the
corresponding length of the equation exacerbate potential jury confusion.
Conceivably, both standard deviation analysis and Bayes' Theorem could
rely on computations so difficult that the court would have to appoint an
expert to explain the formulas used to the fact finder. Despite any
'" See id. at 331-33, 438 P.2d at 40-1, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05 (California Supreme Court
noted the length of jury deliberation, extensive use of circumstantial evidence and that
mathematical formula could not establish whether witnesses correctly observed and
reported descriptions of defendants).
69 See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1979) (expert's stated use of
probabilities at trial speculative and confusing); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 326, 438
P.2d 33, 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1968) (flaws in prosecutor's use of probability theory were
inadequate evidentiary and statistical foundation); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, -, 414
P.2d 858, 862 ( 1966) (mathematical odds inadmissible to identify defendant when odds
are based on invalid estimates). But see United States ex reL DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680
F.2d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1982) (no due process violation to defendant when state's expert
estimated veracity of hair sample analysis in probablistic terms); State v. Carlson, 267
N.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Minn. 1978) (expert testimony regarding validity of hair analysis in
probablistic terms with no statistical foundation improperly admitted but held harmless er-
ror on facts of case).
170 See infra note 193 (jury confusion results from use of statistical evidence).
1' See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 28 EMPL. PRAC. DEC (CCH) 22,664 (N.D. Ill.
1982). In Coates, the plaintiff brought an action alleging unlawful employment practices on
the part of the defendant company. Id. at 24,998. The plaintiff maintained that the employer
terminated the plaintiff's employment because of race, rather than for the employer's
stated reason of sleeping on the job. Id. at 24,999. Both plaintiff and defendant relief on ex-
pert's statistical studies of discharges from the defendant's workforce. Id. at 25,026. From
these identical figures the experts derived opposite conclusions and each spent much of the
rest of the trial attacking the other's analysis. Id. at 25,026-25,030. Both experts agreed that
personal knowledge would be necessary to distinguish between a voluntary employment
termination and an involuntary discharge. Id. at 25,026. The district court in Coates
ultimately found the plaintiff's statistical evidence insufficient to support a prima facie case
of discrimination. Id. at 25,030.
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relevance the contested evidence might have, then, confusion and pre-
judice appear to outweigh the probative value.'72
Additionally, critics contend that empirical evidence encroaches
upon the jury's function as fact finder 7 ' and that statistical evidence
asks the "wrong" questions, those based on objective factors, when at-
tempting to determine a subjective condition of guilt or innocence. 4 Em-
pirical evidence is "hard" evidence that lends itself to a determination of
objective facts such as identity. 7' Statistical data does not focus upon
the so-called "soft" variables, 7 ' those of knowledge or intent, that are
often necessary elements of a crime. By directing attention away from
the softer variables, statistical evidence tends to remove determinative
legal issues from a juror's focus.'77 Over-emphasis of the objective facts
to the potential exclusion of other issues does not clarify the fact finder's
thought process.'78 Rather, through application to only hard variables,
the data imitates a trier of fact's own intuitive thought processes by
focusing more closely on one piece of evidence than another. The crucial
difference lies in the fact that a determination of a hard variable made
through statistics is not subject to revision.7 9
The definiteness associated with statistical data often causes the
evidence to impinge on the jury's function. 8' Statistical evidence may
virtually dictate a juror's resolution of trial outcome."' The compulsion
177 See infra note 199 (exclusion of relevant evidence in certain instances).
7 See State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1978) (defendant objected to plain-
tiff's expert's statement on probability of validity of hair sample analysis as stating conclu-
sion of fact that invaded province of jury).
' See infra note 177 (force of statistical evidence different from determination of
guilt).
"I See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1366.
176 Id.
177 See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1979) (prosecution's
statements that hair sample analysis is 99.44% correct misdirected jury's attention from
identification of perpetrator to identification of hair); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 321,
438 P.2d 33, 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1968) (prosecution's use of probability theory focused
jury's attention on number of couples in local area with same characteristics as
perpetrators, not whether defendants were perpetrators).
17 See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1372 (precision of mathematical formula could so distract
jury that conviction could result despite reasonable doubt); see also infra note 137 (no
thought clarification but confusion results from the use of statistical evidence).
' See Underwood, Law and the Crystal Balk Predicting Behavior with Statistical In-
ference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1423 (1979). Underwood
distinguishes between statistical decision-making and clinical, or thought process decision-
making regarding parole applicants. Id. Underwood introduced the argument that clinical
decision-making is an inarticulable form of statistical decision-making. Id. The author
distinguished the two types of decision-making on the grounds that a clinical decision maker
is able to respond to outside stimuli not accounted for by any previously set rule. Id.
"I See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 332, 438 P.2d 33, 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 505
(1968) (California Supreme Court held that prosecutor's use of probabilities to indicate
defendant's guilt or innocence distracted jury from function of weighing evidence).




arises from utilization of a precise format and terminology that may
leave the fact finder no room to draw any conclusions, for the trier of
fact has no hard evidence to support a potentially different result.'82
Ultimately, an unskilled juror may feel coerced into agreeing with the ex-
pert's conclusions. Although the limiting of the jury's function would not
eliminate the need for an impartial fact finder, the importance of the
trier of fact becomes secondary to that of the expert. This is a highly
undesirable result in a legal system that relies extensively on the jury as
fact finder.1"
Despite conceptual and evidentiary difficulties, statistical evidence
has become central to modern legal structure. Especially in cases involv-
ing large or unwieldy amounts of proof arising out of complex modern
litigation, statistical refinement is a rational way to present evidence to
a court.1 The data enables attorneys to present a broad overview of
issues integral to litigation and is a time saving device as well as a per-
suasive tool. The utility of statistical evidence, however, does not always
outweigh negative factors associated with the data's employment. 8' In
determining the admissibility of a given statistical theory, therefore, a
court must weigh and consider potential prejudicial and probative value.
Due largely to Bayes' Theorem's inability to display probative
characteristics, courts correctly have held the theorem inapplicable to
the issue of a particular defendant's guilt or innocence. 88 Since Bayes'
Theorem operates on the assumption that it is possible to give
mathematical weight to a human's perceptions of individual pieces of
evidence at trial,18 7 courts have remained skeptical of the theory's ap-
plicability. '88 Courts and commentators fear the manner in which the
theory uses objective variables to obtain a subjective verdict of guilt or
"8 See Tribe, supra note 1, at 1375 (jurors exposed to statistical evidence incapable of
placing proper emphasis on statistics compared to other, nonempirical data); see also infra
note 187 (cases disallowing probability theory due to perceived effect upon jury).
'83 See generally Good, In Praise of Jury Trials, 7 Litigation 51 (Winter, 1981) (discuss-
ing American emphasis on jury trials); Edquist, The Use of Juries in Complex Cases, 3
CORP. L. REV. 277 (1980) (use of jury despite complexity of case).
'8 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussion of use of statistical evidence
in varying legal areas).
"' See infra note 187 and accompanying text (evidence too prejudicial and not pro-
bative enough to support jury verdicts of conviction). But see United States ex rel.
DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 1982Y (statement concerning validity of
hair sample allowed in evidence despite jury confusion, otherwise probative value of
evidence would be minimized).
'" See infra note 179; see also Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 317 Mass.
469 (1945). In Smith, the plaintiff attempted to prove defendant's bus caused her injury by
showing that only the defendant company operated a bus route on the street where the acci-
dent took place. Id. at 754. The court stated that mathematical evidence merely favoring a
proposition is not enough to establish liability. Id. at 755. Instead, an event is proved by ac-
tual belief in the evidence on the part of the jury despite any lingering doubts. Id. at 755.
" See supra note 112 (description of application of Bayes' Theorem).
' See infra note 207 (courts attempt to compensate, for prejudice connected with prob-
ability theory).
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innocence.' 9 Although Bayes' Theorem embodies an idea that in theory
could prove helpful to legal decision-making, the practical effect is jury
confusion without concurrent probative value.'90 Perhaps the theorem
would be useful if each trier of fact could place a changable value on
pieces of evidence to force the fact finder to examine precisely what is
weighed when deciding guilt, innocence or liability. That decision is
ultimately so subjective, however, that quantification is nearly impossi-
ble. For these reasons, courts have properly rejected Bayes' Theorem as
a method of determining the ultimate outcome of a trial.'9'
Courts and commentators alike have found statistical evidence
derived from cases concerning numerical factors, on the other hand, to
be entirely appropriate.' 2 Measurable events, such as a loss of future
earnings or the number of minority employees hired by a given
employer, are the types of factors that statistics present concisely and
clearly to a court.'93 Statistical data operates as a summarization device
both in terms of time and parties. Mathematical evidence may be used to
analyze occurrences over periods of time that involve vast amounts of
facts, breaking the events down into managable sequences for a court's
perusal.'94 Additionally, attorneys use statistical evidence to examine
claims relating to a single party or a larger class.'9" Although empirical
evidence might not be the only manner in which a court could hear large
groups of facts,'96 statistics are undeniably efficient in their reflection of
,"9 See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1366. Professor Tribe states that probability theory
lends itself to an examination of hard or objective variables and does not look to subjective
variables such as violation, knowledge or intent. Id.; see United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d
676, 681 (8th Cir. 1979). The Massey court found the prosecutor's remarks concerning the
probability of the validity of a hair sample prejudicial. 594 F.2d at 681. The court stated that
the prosecutor incorrectly linked hair identification (hard variable) with identification of the
perpetrator of the crime (soft variable). Id.
190 See supra note 187 (use of statistical evidence unhelpful).
19, See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1350 (juror has difficulty quantifying various pieces of
evidence, much less total outcome).
92 See United States v. Massey, 549 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979). In Massey, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed defendant's conviction on a bank robbery charge and remanded the case for a
new trial due to the prosecution's reference to probability theory in closing argument. Id. at
681. In closing argument, the prosecution relied heavily on the state's expert's reference to
a Canadian study suggesting that a laboratory analysis of hair samples is incorrect only one
in 4,500 times. Id. at 679. The prosecutor translated the expert's statement to mean that a
hair analysis will be correct 99.44% of the time. Id. at 680. The circuit court reversed the
conviction, holding that the prosecutor confused the jury, relating identification of hair to
identification of the robber. Id. at 681; see People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The California Supreme Court reversed defendant's robbery convic-
tion holding that probability theory lacked an adequate statistical foundation and distracted
the jury from weighing evidence of guilt. 68 Cal. 2d at 327, 438 P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at
502.
9 See supra notes 9-14 (statistics as trial aid).
,9 See supra notes 12 and 14 (use of statistics in employment discrimination litigation





numerical occurrences. In addition to providing an overview, statistics
are concise, putting the fact finder immediately in possession of informa-
tion necessary to a decision. Evidence directed to the core of a litigated
issue is always relevant" ' and is therefore essential to a trier of fact.
Despite the benefits of statistical evidence, the legal community as a
whole exhibits a strong distrust of such data. '98 Criticism of statistical
evidence is based upon a justifiable fear of statistician's bias, confusion
of both judge and jury, and overemphasis of the evidence itself."9 Bias on
the part of the statistician is especially damaging because of both the ef-
fect on evidence and the difficulty of detection.2 0 Lawyers perceive the
potential distortion as a manifestation of the extreme manipulability of
statistical evidence." Proponents of statistical theory point to statisti-
cian's prejudice as a minor, controllable flaw when compared to the ad-
vantageous aspects of empirical data."'
Confusion in the employment of statistical theory is an additional
disadvantage that affects both the court and jury. The application of
standard deviation theory has proved so difficult for courts unfamiliar
with statistical analysis that the Supreme Court has reversed and
remanded cases ' based on the lack of elements essential to the analysis
and has commented on the correct use of standard deviation theory. 4
While a higher court may remand judicial mathematical error for correc-
"' See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 3, 338 (1977) (statistical
evidence admitted, but Court found individual testimony of specific discriminatbry events
persuasive); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ext. Serv., 528 F.2d 508, 517 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
looked to specific instances of discrimination as easier to understand than statistical
evidence); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Pet Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 543 F.
Supp. 911, 914 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (statistical evidence does not require support from expert
analysis); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 438-40 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (women alleg-
ing wage discrimination in jobs of equal or higher qualification, skill and responsibility to
those of males used evidence of lower pay, job description, number of each sex holding
specific jobs and personal testimony of discrimination).
' See FED. R. EvID. 401 (definition of relevant evidence making any fact of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more or less probable). But see FED. R. EVID. 403
(court may exclude relevant evidence if probative value outweighed by prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading jury, delay, waste of time, needless presentation of cumulative
evidence).
See supra notes 6-8 (discussing commentator's objections to statistical evidence).
See supra note 6 (effect of bias in statistical evidence).
' See supra note 172 (identical statistics result in opposing evidence).
See supra text accompanying notes 194-95 (advantages of statistical evidence). See
supra text accompanying notes 41-60 (analysis of cases reversed and remanded by the
Supreme Court for various faults in statistical analysis).
I See Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977). The Casteneda Court
defined a standard deviation as the measure of predicted changes from the expected value
of a given occurrence. Id. The Court also stated that a difference of greater than two or
three standard deviations results in a social scientist's finding that the events under litiga-
tion did not occur at random. Id.
See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 332, 438 P.2d 38, 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 505
(1968) (jury confusion theorized by court on basis of length of deliberation and largely cir-
cumstantial evidence).
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tions, an appellate court may not recognize or rectify jury confusion as
easily."5 Therefore, the greatest criticism of statistical evidence is that a
jury perplexed by mathematical evidence will over-emphasize the
importance of the statistics and will minimize the effect of other, nonem-
pirical, evidence. 6 The alternative, that the jury will be so bewildered
by the data that the jury will disregard the evidence completely is an
equally bad result. In either case, the outcome reduces the importance of
a jury as a trier of fact to a body that mindlessly affirms or rejects the
results of statistical studies without full consideration of the data's
merits.0 7
Many of the difficulties perceived in the use of statistical data stem
from the fact that the precision of the numbers causes the evidence to
appear irrefutable. A jury perceives statistics as somehow more
"logical" and less impeachable than other types of evidence. 8 For an op-
posing attorney the most arduous task will be to reduce a fact finder's
confidence in statistics as a discipline. Otherwise it will be difficult for
any fact finder to weigh empirical evidence rationally along with other
kinds of evidence adduced at trial. The lawyer does have several alter-
natives with which to combat this stress on mathematical evidence.
First, the attorney should attempt to be sure that an expert's data is cor-
rect, perhaps by placing a series of controls on the manner in which the
expert gathers and correlates data.2 ' Commentators supporting the con-
tinued employment of statistics urge the use of controls, perhaps
emanating from statisticians as a group. Additionally, an attorney could
request a limiting instruction from the judge that would evaluate the
probative value of mathematical data in relation to all the other
205 Id.
I See supra note 179 (jury could convict on basis of statistical evidence despite
reasonable doubt).
" See State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Minn. 1978). In a murder case, the ap-
pellate court held that the trial court improperly heard the state expert's pronouncement
that a one in 4,500 chance existed that head hairs found in the victim's hand did not belong
to the defendant. Id. at 175. The court feared that not even cross-examination could
diminish the impact of mathematical precision on a jury. Id. at 176; see People v. Collins, 68
Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The California Supreme Court disallowed
the use of mathematical evidence due to the unfairness to a defendant resulting from
evidence with which a trier of fact is not equipped to cope. 68 Cal. 2d at 332, 438 P.2d at 41,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 505. But see United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515 (7th
Cir. 1982). DiGiacomo objected to the state's expert witness' statement that a one in 4,500
chance existed that hairs found in the victim's car did not belong to DiGiacomo. Id. at 519.
Defendant maintained that the expert's conclusion couched in mathematical probability
resulted in a denial of a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 516. The Seventh Circuit held
that jury confusion did not result in error of constitutional magnitude and that restriction of
the expert's testimony would have reduced the probative value of the state's evidence. Id.
at 519.
208 680 F.2d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1982).
2"9 See supra notes 82-83 (problems to be avoided when gathering statistical evidence).
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evidence."' The third alternative, retaining an expert or attacking the
credibility of the opposing expert to reveal more favorable evidence, is
troublesome."' The issue then becomes the individual exper's believabili-
ty rather than the veracity of the actual evidence. Finally, an attorney
could move to exclude the statistical evidence because of high prejudice
and low probative value. 2
Whether an individual attorney opposes or supports the use of
statistical evidence is immaterial. Empirical data is used more and more
frequently in litigation.213 A lawyer should try to learn of possible dif-
ficulties arising out of the use of such data to successfully present and
defend cases involving statistical evidence. As the legal profession
grows more accustomed to employment of the data, perhaps law and
science will be able to produce a more efficient and consistent legal
system.
CLAIRE ELIZABETH PANCERZ
2,0 See supra note 205 (result of use of statistical evidence overemphasized by jury).
1 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (exclusion allowed if prejudicial value of the evidence
outweighs its probative value).
212 See supra notes 93-98 (difficulty in cross-examining an expert witness).
21 See supra notes 9-14 (use of empirical data in varied areas of law).
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